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Hyperinflation:  A Theory On The 
Ignorance Concerning Money And Interest 





In cases of hyperinflation the exchange rate varies at a rate close to the rate of inflation and the 
savings present in the financial system lose their capacity to be invested. One could say that there 
is a demand for the stongest foreign currency for transactional and speculative purposes that is 
equal to the traditional demand for money. At the same time, savings lose their purchasing power 
due to the speed and fluctuations in the rate of increase of prices.  
 





yperinflation is characterised by a rapid rise in prices and by the speed and irregularity of that 
increase. Periods of hyperinflation lead to loss of confidence and then to panic in the money 
markets, generating a massive demand for foreign currency, particularly for the strongest foreign 
currency. Paradoxically, there is the domestic currency in cases of hyperinflation, given that people lose confidence 
in it at the same speed at which they put their confidence in the strongest foreign currency, for example, the US 
dollar. The domestic currency is normally used to make payments but is increasingly rejected by payees in favour of 
foreign currency. This is the demand for money for transactional purposes. Money is also required for speculative 
purposes to protect those holding it against the loss in value of their savings.  
 
The exchange rate can change at the same speed as the domestic rate of inflation, faster than this rate, or 
more slowly. This is the question we set out to examine. 
 
In the same way in which there is a money market versus a financial market, as defined in the LM curve, 
there is also a currency market versus a domestic money market. 
 
In the financial system, savings lose their purchasing power due to the speed of inflation, with the result 
that they take refuge in speculating in hard and financial assets. This is one-way traffic and prevents those savings 
from being invested productively. 
 
The supply of and demand for currency, speculative hard assets and budget deficits cause variations in the 
supply of and demand for money, which causes fluctuations in the interest rates, the so-called ‘yo-yo’ effect, which 
also discourages investment. 
 
The domestic currency is employed less and less in investment and production, thereby accelerating the 




In periods of hyperinflation, prices rise very fast because the available money supply itself rises very fast 
and, given that this situation is dynamic and ongoing in time, the relation between the domestic money supply and 
other currencies is also continuous. What this means is that more domestic currency is available for a unit of account 
of the leading foreign currency. This can occur for a multitude of reasons, but we can simplify by saying that this is 
H 
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made possible for the simple reason that proportionally, more domestic money is generated than, in terms of real 
growth, foreign currency is available.  
 
Bidding for available foreign currency and the demand for this, paid for in domestic currency, is what 
establishes the exchange rate. So, changes in the exchange rate can be understood as fluctuations in the demand for 
and supply of foreign currency. 
 
DEMAND FOR FOREIGN CURRENCY 
 
Demand for foreign currency arises for three reasons: first, the need to pay for imports and exports and 
other balance-of-payment transactions, i.e. for transactions arising out of national spending in relation to the rest of 
the world; secondly, because of rising transactions demand within a domestic economy which is experiencing 
hyperinflation; and, thirdly, for purposes of speculation.  
 
There is a formal and even conceptual parallel between this market and the orthodox money market that 
helps to explain the LM curve. Let us look for a moment at the two cases. In doing so, we should add to the equation 
the overreaction of countries suffering hyperinflation.  This overreaction is the degree of desperation experienced by 
the holders of asset portfolios when trying to exchange domestic currency for foreign currency by all means 
available. 
 
1.  The demand for currency in the balance of payments 
 
Currency is needed first of all to pay for imports. As countries also export, foreign currency is also needed 
to pay for exports to the extent that these exceed imports (X–M). This analysis tells only half the story because it 
looks exclusively at the trade balance. What generally happens when countries suffer hyperinflation is that on one 
side exporters do whatever they can to be paid in foreign currency as opposed to domestic currency. And at the same 
time the exporters of other countries also insist on being paid in the strongest currency and on no account in the 
depreciated currency of the importing country. This results in a market of supply and demand for foreign currency 
which depends, leaving aside the capital balance, on a surplus or deficit in the trade balance. Seen in this light, a 
point of equilibrium or stability will only be reached if there is a foreign trade surplus. If, however, there is a deficit 
in the trade balance, the depreciation of the domestic currency will gather even greater speed than that produced by 
the overreaction. This explains why currencies tend to depreciate faster than the domestic rate of inflation.  
 
2.  Transactions demand 
 
The demand for money to pay for transactions depends of the level of disposable income (L(Y)). 
Transactions demand for currency also depends on the level of disposable income, but not on all disposable income, 
only part, Y*, expressed as Y*<Y. This is due to the lack of confidence of sellers in the domestic currency, whose 
rate of depreciation is difficult to forecast. Sellers want to be paid in a strong foreign currency instead of the 
domestic currency. Most major contracts are paid in foreign currency on the understanding that this will appreciate 
at least as fast as the domestic rate of inflation.   
 
Not all, but a significant number of domestic transactions are paid for in foreign currency, bought on the 
currency markets, in view of the intrinsic needs of transactional operations. For this reason it is held that such 
purchases vary according to the partial disposable income: Y*. At the same time, the sellers who receive the 
currency, wherever possible act as speculators, thereby driving the overreaction in the currency market. If this trend 
sets in seriously, the domestic currency depreciates faster than the rate of inflation, however high this may be. 
 
3  Speculative demand 
 
The greatest concern of those holding investment portfolios, i.e. consumers, savers, speculators, is to 
maintain the value of their real balances (M/P). To achieve this they must keep the nominal value of their portfolios 
at the same level as prices, such that ΔM > ΔP or ΔM = ΔP.  The easiest way of maintaining their real balances at 
least constant is to convert the nominal balances into currency. To what extent is it legitimate to differentiate 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – April 2009 Volume 8, Number 4 
79 
disposable income balances from savings balances and savings balances from speculative balances in terms of 
money suitable for being exchanged for currency?  Disposable income balances, given the daily needs of living, 
rarely offer this possibility. Savings, however, as they occupy for a short space of time a place in the financial 
system, are monetary values apt for being used to protect their value against inflation by being converting into 
foreign currency; they can also be exchanged for hard and speculative assets that do not form part of the current 
producing period.  
 
Given that the feature that defines hyperinflation is not just the absolute rise in prices but also the speed and 
volatility at which this takes place, the savings within the financial system that proceed from the current period, and 
which derive from disposable income, rapidly become foreign currency obtained in the currency market. The net 
result is a synchronisation, perhaps better defined as a confusion, between the financial system and the currency 
market. However quickly savings can be generated and take their place in the financial system, it is always long 
enough for them to lose their purchasing power in terms of parity with foreign currency. The resulting urgency to 
exchange them creates the overreaction which makes the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency exceed the 
real rate of domestic inflation. 
 
SUPPLY OF THE STRONGEST CURRENCY 
 
It is interesting to ask at this stage why suppliers of, for example, the US dollar are prepared to exchange 
them for a depreciated and depreciating currency.  The answer is speculation, that same speculation that drives 
demand for foreign currency on the part of private sector suppliers. In the case of institutional providers, the reason 
why the central bank of a country whose currency is depreciating is prepared to do this is to maintain the nominal 
exchange rate.   
 
Suppliers of foreign currency offer it at its true value, i.e. M/P, and thus their forecast of the rise in prices is 
crucial when it comes to offering that supply. Given that one of the features of hyperinflation is the fluctuation and 
speed of the increase in prices, together with the overreaction on the part of buyers, the supply of foreign currency 
frequently dries up. For there to be an overreaction it is necessary, as noted above, for the expectation of the rate of 
increase in prices to be nil, in consequence of the fluctuations in said increase in prices. On the other hand, if the 
supplier is the central bank, participants in the economy know that the bank will soon exhaust its stock of strong 
foreign currency in its efforts to maintain a stable exchange rate. This awareness leads to the overreaction in the 
marketplace which causes a rise in the demand for foreign currency. Again, the net result of this is that in relative 
terms there is a greater demand for foreign currency that for domestic currency, leading to accelerated depreciation 




People who try to steal a march on the markets by anticipating events very often provoke changes in the 
exchange rate that influence the overreaction.  
 
These arguments have much to do with the so-called ‘cause-and-effect reversal’, which occurs when certain 
behaviour appears to have consequences that are, in reality, its causes. It is like people buying winter coats before 
winter starts. The two phenomena are related but winter is the not the consequence of people buying winter coats but 
the cause.  
 
Let us look at the following cases. Suppliers of foreign currency believe, rightly, that inflation will 
accelerate and that there will therefore be increased demand for foreign currency in an effort to offset the loss in real 
terms. They also know that the terms offered will decrease (M/ΔP). What they then do is to restrict the supply in real 
terms of the strong currency with a view to provoking faster depreciation of the domestic currency and an 
appreciation of the foreign currency that outpaces the rate of inflation. This situation will reveal to all the inability of 
the central bank and the holders of foreign currency to support the domestic currency, which will cause even faster 
depreciation in absolute terms than the underlying level of devaluation. Another example: a forecast of inflation 
leads to advance demand for goods and services causing tension in the money markets because more cash is 
required to make these purchases. The monetary authority receives this information and prints more money to allow 
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these purchases to take place and, as a result, inflation accelerates. Faced with unexpectedly fast inflation, the 
holders of cash portfolios try to switch into foreign currency, with the result that the rate of inflation climbs to a 
level that at least parallels the appreciation of the foreign currency if it does not surpass it.  
 
The overreaction and the accelerated depreciation of a domestic currency against a strong foreign currency 
are directly related to two key central-bank policies that are, in fact, contradictory. The first is that of trying to limit 
inflation by exercising a contractive monetary policy; the second is to create more money when the financial system 




What we are looking at in reality is a market made up of a strong currency that is in demand and is 
available in countries suffering hyperinflation.  It is similar in form and concept to the money market made up of the 
demand for money for transactional purposes and the speculative demand arising from the predicted rate of inflation. 
Both demands and available supply of foreign currency act simultaneously, resulting in an overreaction, which is the 
level of sensitivity to the rejection of the depreciated currency.  
 
Not only does the domestic currency depreciated against the strong currency; also the rate of depreciation 
exceeds that of inflation. This is due partly to the overreaction and partly to the fact that the availability of the strong 
currency is considerably less than the rate of increase in the depreciation of the currency concerned.  
 
Demand for foreign currency for purposes of speculation has a very important role to play in this because it 
has a direct bearing on the level of savings in the financial system which, in an economy undergoing rapid inflation, 
quickly loses its purchasing power. To protect savings in real terms, investors buy the strong currency faster and 
faster, thereby accelerating the rate of depreciation of their own currency.  
 
Very often the sensation or overreaction felt in the money markets when a currency begins to appreciate 
means that that currency appreciates faster than the underlying rate of inflation. The same happens in reverse.  
 
This paper contains two arguments: one is that in cases of hyperinflation the irregularity of the rate of 
inflation or variations in the speed of inflation play a very important role; the other is that it is an overreaction by 
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